This paper examines the extent to which private savings responds to the availability of a social insurance program. We focus on the Medicaid nursing home assistance program and uses variation in state Medicaid policies in the 1960s and 1990s to identify whether household wealth correlates negatively with access to public insurance coverage. We use data from the 1962 and 1970 Survey of Consumer Finances and the 1992 through 2002 Health and Retirement Study. We find that household savings in 1970 was substantially lower in states with easier access to Medicaid assistance and that household savings in the 1990s was lower when access to the Medicaid program was lower.
Introduction
One in five persons over the age of 65 will spend at least a year in a nursing home, and the majority of nursing home residents will have limited private insurance coverage for nursing home costs.
1 Expenses in a nursing home average around $60,000 a year (MetLife, 2004) and in the absence of private insurance, individuals must finance these expenses with their own resources or financing from public programs, such as the Medicaid program.
Given the high cost of nursing home care, Medicaid potentially generates strong incentives for older households at risk of incurring nursing home expenses to adjust private savings. Although moral hazard is a general concern for most social insurance programs, it is not clear how large an issue it is for the Medicaid nursing home program. To qualify for
Medicaid nursing home assistance, an applicant must meet the state's statutory limit on income and assets. The income and asset thresholds, however, are generally very low. 2 The stringent financial eligibility criteria for Medicaid nursing home assistance, along with the potential stigma associated with claiming public assistance and concerns about the quality of Medicaid-financed nursing home care, may deter individuals from relying on Medicaid in the future. Given these competing incentives, the overall effect on private savings is uncertain.
This paper examines whether, and to what extent, the Medicaid program affects private savings.
Simulation studies have shown that when a social insurance program sets low asset standards for eligibility, savings of households who plan to qualify for the program will be low (Hubbard, Skinner, and Zeldes, 1995) . One implication is that private savings of 1 Long-term nursing home care is not a covered benefit for the elderly under the Medicare program, and few households carry private long-term care insurance. 2 In 1992, the monthly income limits ranged between $422 and $724, and the asset limit was $2,000 for most states (the range was $1,000 to $4,000).
1 households that plan to use the social insurance program will increase when asset thresholds are raised. The empirical evidence in this regard has been mixed. Gardner and Gilleskie (2006) find a positive relationship between elderly households' net worth and Medicaid's asset thresholds in the state where they reside, and Powers (1998) finds that private savings of low-earning women increased with the increase in Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) qualifying asset limits in 1981. Hurst and Ziliak (2005) , however, find no change in the savings of a similar population (female-headed households with children) with the loosening of asset limits in the 1996 reform of AFDC.
Access to Medicaid may affect private savings by reducing the risk of nursing home expenses. 3 With lower risk of medical expenses, households reduce private savings. Gruber and Yelowitz (1999) find that when the Medicaid program was expanded to AFDC program recipients, private savings of the newly-eligible population fell by 18 percent. Those results, however, are based on changes in Medicaid eligibility rules that target low-income, workingaged households. The nursing home component of the Medicaid program targets older and potentially, higher income households, and there is limited evidence on whether access to Medicaid nursing home assistance will induce similar reductions in private savings. 4 This paper explores whether this component of moral hazard is evident with the Medicaid nursing home program. Walker (2006) finds some evidence that household wealth is lower in states with less restrictive Medicaid eligibility standards and concludes that at least $24,000 of retirement wealth is attributable to saving for nursing home expenses. Those results, however, are identified off a policy change that occurred 30 years prior to the date when wealth is observed in the data. 5 The result of that paper might be biased by unobserved time-varying state effects. To circumvent that issue, this paper focuses on how changes in savings are correlated with contemporaneous policy differences.
The paper examines the savings response from two different time periods. We first look back at the period when Medicaid was introduced -the 1960s. The 1960s began with very few states offering any public assistance and ended with the majority of states offering some public coverage for nursing home care through Medicaid. 6 Across states, the eligibility standards for Medicaid nursing home assistance varied, providing an additional source of variation in access to public insurance for nursing home expenses. We use data from the 1962 and 1970 Surveys of Consumer Finances (SCF) to compare how household wealth differed across different states before and after Medicaid was introduced. We find substantial differences in wealth that are correlated with the timing of nursing home coverage by Medicaid.
We next examine the effects of Medicaid in the 1990s on private savings, using data from the Health and Retirement Study (HRS). 7 We exploit variation in whether states include assets that were used to purchase a Medicaid annuity as part of the applicant's "countable" assets. In general, Medicaid disregards some portion of an applicant's assets when determining eligibility. All remaining assets are considered "countable" assets and used to determine eligibility. To qualify for Medicaid, applicants must reduce countable assets to the state's asset threshold (This is sometimes referred to as the Medicaid tax on assets). 8 Assets that are disregarded are effectively exempt from the Medicaid tax on assets.
Cross-state differences in whether the assets used to purchase Medicaid annuities are disregarded generate substantial differences in the effective Medicaid tax on assets. As the effective tax on assets increases, the cost of using Medicaid services increases and the net benefit of the Medicaid program is reduced. Therefore, households facing a higher tax on assets have a lower incentive to apply for Medicaid, and we expect private savings will be higher for these households. We find that households in states with a higher effective
Medicaid tax on assets save significantly more.
Did the Introduction of Medicaid Reduce Private Savings?

Public Assistance for Nursing Home Care in the 1960s
Public assistance for nursing home care was first introduced in 1960 through the MAA program. 9 Between 1960 and 1965, 20 Given the potentially high level of nursing home costs, the use of the medically-needy criterion substantially raised the effective income eligibility limit in medically-needy states.
Thus, in the 1960s substantive variation in Medicaid eligibility existed across states, stemming from whether the state adopted the medically-needy criterion for eligibility. 
Estimation of Savings Effects of Medicaid in the 1960s
We examine whether there were any changes in household savings as a result of the introduction of social insurance for nursing home expenses. If moral hazard was significant, we will observe reduced household savings after the introduction of Medicaid. However, We thus exploit the differences across states in medically-needy coverage, described above, to capture additional variation in Medicaid eligibility standards. Figure 1 The medically-needy criterion might affect savings in the opposite direction. Households in states without a medically-needy program might save less so that they can qualify for Medicaid; households in states with a medically-needy program may save more because they know they will not have to be completely destitute to qualify. Walker (2005) shows that this behavior is more likely to be adopted by households in the lower end of the income distribution and that the medically-needy criterion is less likely to be triggered for these households. 15 See Federal Reserve Board, Reports on the Surveys of Consumer Finances, Federal Reserve Bulletin, 1947 -1959 for more details about the data.
6 more importantly, the data include the respondent's state of residence. The SCF data also include the household's economic and demographic characteristics. The limitation of the SCF is that it is not a panel and we cannot observe changes in household savings over time.
Instead, we use the SCF to compare the net worth of cross sections of households over time and across states.
In 1962, 2,117 households were interviewed, and in 1970, 2,576 households were interviewed. In 1962, the household unit is defined as a spending unit whereas in 1970, the household unit is defined as a family unit. For comparability across years, we use only single spending-unit households. Limiting the sample further to heads of households gives 901
households from 1962 and 1,743 households from 1970. Because the risk of needing nursing home care tends to manifest among the very elderly, we anticipate that households are more likely to account for that risk in their saving decisions at older ages. Therefore, we constrain the sample to include only households with heads between the ages of 45 and 75.
Eliminating all cases with incomplete or missing information yields a final sample of 1,056
households.
16 Table 2 One concern in a difference-in-difference (DD) analysis is that there may be unobservable variables that are correlated with the regressor of interest (in this case, the interaction term of medically-needy states and post-Medicaid households. The summary data from β , is the DD estimator of the effect of social insurance on savings. It measures the average change in household wealth over time between medically-needy and non medically-needy states. For the reasons stated above, we expect that 1 β , will be negative: after controlling for policy endogeneity and year fixed effects, we anticipate that household wealth declined after the passage of Medicaid.
If all households across the income distribution were saving for nursing home care, then the difference-in-different estimator, 1 β , represents private savings for nursing home expenses. However, as Walker (2006) shows, in the absence of public insurance, only certain households in the middle and upper tail of the income distribution will choose to selfinsure against nursing home expenses. Some households, especially those in the lower tail of the income distribution, will choose not to save for nursing home expenses and rely instead on public or charitable sources of nursing home care. Therefore, the estimated effect represents average private savings for nursing home care across the whole income distribution, and it should be interpreted as the lower bound for middle-to high-income households. From column 1, we see that the effect of the Medicaid medically-needy program reduces private savings for households in the 45-74 age range, but the effect of the state policy is not statistically significant. However, the effect among older households is significant. Among households in the 50-75 age range, household net worth is 69 percent lower if they live in a medically-needy state. Among even older households (those in the 55-74 age range), household net worth is 82 percent lower for those in a medically-needy state.
Results: Changes in Private Savings in the 1960s
The median household in this age range held about $72,000 in net worth; therefore, we estimate that the medically-needy provision reduces private savings among these households by almost $60,000. The Medicaid reimbursement rate for nursing home care in 1971 was about $30,000 a year. This suggests that the medically-needy program crowds out 2 years of private savings for nursing home care.
18
While the 1960s provides some useful variation for testing the savings effects of Medicaid policy, relying on these early years of Medicaid to assess the current effects of Medicaid has number of limitations. First, behavior in the 1960s may not be generalizable to the present. Second, because the SCF data in our analysis are made up of pooled cross sections, some differences in savings may reflect cohort differences. Finally, the empirical strategy assumes that households were saving for nursing home care prior to the MAA and 
Do Medicaid Eligibility Rules Currently Affect Private Savings?
Public Assistance for Nursing Home Care in the 1990s.
By the 1990s, Medicaid eligibility differences across States are quite small because States' Medicaid income eligibility standards were mostly equalized. Through enabling federal legislation, states that did not qualify individuals with high medical expenses through the medically needy program provided alternate routes to expanding coverage to non impoverished households. These non-medically needy states can provide assistance to individuals with income up to 300 percent of the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefit amount. 19 In 1992, the SSI monthly benefit amount was $422 for a single household, so individuals with monthly income up to $1,266 who were in a nursing home could qualify for
Medicaid. 20 Furthermore, individuals with income above the 300 percent limit can still qualify if the excess income is placed in a trust (the "Miller's trust") and the funds in the trust are applied towards nursing home costs.
Although the effective Medicaid income standards were mostly equalized by the 1990s, there are still differences across states in the effective asset eligibility standards. The statutory asset limit for Medicaid nursing home eligibility in most states is $2,000.
21
Individuals who meet the income threshold but who exceed the asset threshold must draw down their assets to the state's asset limit before Medicaid begins to pay benefits (This is sometimes referred to as the Medicaid tax on assets). However, the computation of whether the applicant's assets meet the state's statutory asset limit varies by state; and this variation in how assets are "counted" leads to variation in eligibility standards.
There are two ways in which states vary in the computation of an applicant's assets.
First, when a married applicant applies for Medicaid nursing home assistance, each state specifies the amount of household assets that is set aside for the non-institutionalized spouse.
This amount ranges from $17,000 to $87,000. As a consequence, the level of household assets that is attributable to the institutionalized spouse varies by state.
19 This eligibility standard is sometimes referred to as the "special income" rule or "300 percent rule." 20 The maximum SSI monthly benefit amount for couples in 1992 was $633. However, when an individual applies for Medicaid nursing home assistance, the applicant is considered single at that point, even if the applicant is married. 21 Most states disregard the value of the house, a car, and personal items.
The second cross-state difference in eligibility arises through differences in the definition of countable assets. In recent years, this difference comes largely from differences in whether assets that were used to purchase an annuity are considered part of the household's "countable" assets when the applicant applies for Medicaid assistance. In general, Medicaid disregards some portion of an applicant's assets when determining eligibility. All remaining assets are considered "countable" assets and used to determine eligibility. In order to qualify for Medicaid assistance, applicants must reduce countable assets to the state's asset threshold (this is sometimes referred to as the Medicaid tax on assets). 22 Assets that are disregarded are, effectively, exempt from the Medicaid tax on assets. Annuities present a challenge for eligibility determination because the purchase of an annuity converts a stock of assets to a flow of income. Thus, assets that would previously have made a household ineligible for Medicaid are not visible. For those assets to be "disregarded" for Medicaid eligibility, federal law requires that the annuity be actuarially fair and irrevocable (also known as a Medicaid annuity). 23 Assets used to purchase annuities that do not meet these criteria are considered countable assets, and applicants face a penalty period during which they are ineligible for Medicaid coverage. This penalty period is proportional to the purchased value of the annuity.
24
"Medicaid-compliant" annuities can be structured in a variety of ways that maximize the amount of assets that can be transferred to an heir, thereby circumventing some of the 22 In 1971, the asset threshold ranged between $400 and $4,000. 23 Most state Medicaid offices define an actuarially-fair annuity as an annuity with a contract length that matches the SSI life expectancy tables. An irrevocable contract is a contract that is paying or will begin payments within one month of the nursing home application. 24 Prior to 1993, annuities that were purchased within 24 months of the application were subject to this test (the period of retrospective evaluation was called the "look-back" period). The passage of OBRA 1993 increased the "look-back" period to 36 months. Legislation passed in 2006 raised the "look-back" period further to 60 months and changed the computation of the penalty period.
Medicaid tax on assets. For example, annuities can be structured with a low income stream and a balloon payment at the end of the contract period. If the annuitant dies before the end of the contract period, the remaining payouts and balloon payment will transfer to the remainder beneficiary. In addition, annuity contracts can be specified for longer than the annuitant's expected lifespan; at death, payments continue to the remainder beneficiary.
Alternatively, annuities can be purchased for family members. Alternatively, the Medicaid tax on assets may affect how much households "dissave" in their retirement years. Households in states where it is difficult to protect one's assets 25 Households should also redistribute resources to maximize the expected return of their assets by shifting resources towards assets with lower expected marginal tax rates. Because the expected marginal Medicaid tax rate on annuities is zero until the individual is within the Medicaid "look-back" period, which tends to be when the individual is well past retirement age, we do not expect this incentive to affect private savings rate during the household's labor earning years. 26 In a consumption Euler equation, this enters as uncertainty about out-of-pocket medical expenses.
through annuities may dissave more and transfer a greater share of their assets at any point in time than households in other states. In this instance, we expect private savings to be lower in states with more restrictive Medicaid annuity rules. To examine the relationship between private savings and Medicaid annuity rules, we examine changes in households wealth in the 1990s using the HRS data.
Estimation of Private Savings for Nursing Home Care in the 1990s
We These panel data contain measures of household wealth in each wave, allowing us to generate measures of changes in wealth and saving rates. Table 4 provides detailed statistics on wealth and changes in wealth in the HRS data.
We rely on cross-state variation in Medicaid annuity rules during this period to identify any Medicaid-induced changes in savings among households. We sort states into three groups: least restrictive, restrictive, and most restrictive. Figure 2 shows If greater Medicaid annuity restrictions make Medicaid less desirable and lead to greater self-insurance, we expect the coefficients 1 β and 2 β to be negative. Households in more restrictive states might save more because it is more costly to rely on Medicaid assistance. If, however, higher restrictions on Medicaid annuity leads households save less or dissave faster, we would find 1 β and 2 β to be positive. Households in less restrictive states might save more because they know that they will be able to protect these assets from long-term care expenses.
Because state policies may be correlated with state characteristics that correlate with household savings, we include some state-level controls in the j Z vector. 28 These are the elderly poverty rate, median elderly income, the mean nursing home daily rate, and the median home price. We also control for household-level characteristics in the X vector.
These include age; age squared; dummy variables for self-rated health (good health is the reference group); dummy variables for household type (married is the reference group); years of education; Black race; dummy variables for whether the household had children; owns a home, stocks, or IRAs; dummy variables for whether the household has a pension; or is retired at baseline; the natural log of 1992 household income and the occupation at the last held job. Income and occupation are specifically meant to proxy for lifetime earnings.
The analysis is performed at the household level. Individual characteristics such as education, age and occupation are taken at baseline and are from the "household head", defined to be the husband in a married household. If a household divorces between 1992 and 2002, we consider the household to be two separate households for the entire period. We restrict our analysis to households aged 51-58 in 1992 (who are then 61-68 in 2002) to reduce the chance that some households have already entered nursing homes or started dissaving.
Results: Changes in Private Savings in the 1990s
We first estimate (2) among all households aged 51-58 in 1992 who have positive wealth. We estimate the equation using both household net worth and non-housing net worth.
Results for total net worth are reported in column 1 of Table 6 . 29 Column 1 shows that the coefficients on Medium and Low are negative for both all wealth and non-housing wealth, indicating that households in states with less restrictive annuity policies save less than those in the most restrictive states. The coefficients are not always statistically significant, however. Because protection of assets from long-term care expenses may be a much bigger 29 Results using non-housing net worth are generally similar and are not reported in this paper.
concern for married households, we next estimate (2) among households married at baseline, and we focus most of our discussion on this sample.
Column 2 of Table 6 presents results for households married at baseline. We include dummy variables indicating the 2002 marital status of the household, since some households may have divorced or become widowed and this may have had a big effect on their wealth.
Again, the coefficients on the Medium and Low are negative, suggesting that households in the most restrictive states save more. The coefficients are all statistically significant at either the 5 percent or 10 percent level. The magnitude of the coefficients does not suggest a monotonic relationship between restrictiveness and saving, however: those in Medium restrictive states seem to save the most. The magnitude on the total wealth specification implies that households in the most restrictive states save 18 percent less (or dissave 18 percent more) than households in medium restrictive states and 9 percent less than households in least restrictive states. The estimated effect on non-housing wealth is similar, though the magnitudes are somewhat larger.
The results suggests that very restrictive Medicaid annuity policies lead to greater savings, perhaps because households are more likely to self-insure when Medicaid is more restrictive. There is no evidence that the higher effective Medicaid tax in these states results in reduced saving. The fact that the coefficients increase in magnitude when we restrict the sample to married households are consistent with the fact that that asset protection and thus Medicaid rules should be more important to individuals with a spouse.
Estimated coefficients for covariates are generally not surprising. A higher level of baseline wealth is associated with lower savings rates though greater baseline income, being a homeowner, owning stocks and having an IRA are associated with greater savings rates.
Better health, more years of education, and staying married through 2002 are all associated with higher savings rates. Having children (who may be adults) is associated with lower savings rates.
If our results truly reflect incentives created by Medicaid, we would expect larger estimated effects among individuals who think they are more likely to need long-term care services. To see if this is the case, we estimate (2) among households in fair or poor health at baseline, among households married at baseline. The sample size is small, but the results in Table 7 provide some evidence of stronger responses among those in poor health. The coefficients on Medium restrictiveness are significantly larger that those estimated among all married households, though the coefficients on Less restrictive states are not significant.
Among households in fair or poor health, living in a state with less restrictive Medicaid eligibility is associated with 35% greater savings in total wealth and 48% greater saving in non-housing wealth.
Conclusion
In a recent survey of TIAA-CREF annuitants, respondents indicated that concern about nursing home expenses is one of the primary reasons for saving (Heim, 1992 State controls include elderly poverty rate, median elderly income, the mean nursing home daily rate, and the median home price Standard errors in parentheses. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
